Thomas de Waal: Pashinyan has given away a lot, his pockets are now almost empty

Thomas de Waal, a senior fellow with Carnegie Europe, specializing in Eastern Europe and the Caucasus region, has reflected on the conclusion of the peace deal negotiations between Armenia and Azerbaijan, stressing that the agreement is about state-to-state normalization, not societal reconciliation.

"The international context is critical. As Moscow and Washington negotiate over Ukraine’s future, the Armenians in particular fear a scenario where Russia, unburdened by war, will turn an aggressive gaze on the South Caucasus once again. Agreeing, even in principle, to the text of a bilateral peace agreement to open diplomatic relations between the two adversaries gives Moscow less leverage to interfere," he said in an article.

"The progress is chiefly thanks to the persistence of Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan, who has made a series of concessions in pursuit of a deal. The breakthrough came after his team agreed to give ground on two outstanding issues in the twelfth draft of a seventeen-article text that had been negotiated for more than a year.

"The new text commits the parties to withdraw, dismiss, or settle legal claims against each other currently filed in international courts, such as the International Court of Justice. They have also agreed not to deploy “third-party forces” on their common border. That precludes a Russian presence on the border but also threatens the future of the European Union Mission in Armenia (EUMA), the EU’s civilian border monitoring mission whose mandate was recently extended until 2027. EUMA has been a flagship project for both the EU and Armenia, providing reassurance to Armenian civilians in border areas. If Armenia wants to preserve the mission, it will have to agree to major changes to EUMA’s mandate.  

"One important yet unresolved issue is being negotiated separately: that of connectivity and the modalities for the restoration of road and rail links, especially the route that connects western Azerbaijan with the Azerbaijani exclave of Nakhchivan across Armenian territory," Thomas de Waal penned.

He stated that this is a document about state-to-state normalization, not societal reconciliation as it lacks the elements that usually accompany a historic peace agreement and deal with the legacy of conflict, such as justice mechanisms for war crimes or pledges on the right of return for displaced people.

"There is no mention of the issue over which both nations fought two wars, lost thousands of lives, and suffered unbearable pain: the Armenian-majority region of Nagorny Karabakh, recognized internationally as being part of Azerbaijan. That issue was settled by force in September 2023 when Azerbaijan captured Karabakh, and its entire Armenian population of 100,000 people fled. Pashinyan now acknowledges that Karabakh is part of Azerbaijan, and no one expects that the Karabakh Armenians will return home any time soon," he underlined.

"Citing its own past traumas, Baku places a big precondition on final closure of a peace deal by insisting that it can only be signed once Armenia makes changes to its constitution. The Azerbaijani side points to the Armenian constitution’s preamble, which refers to Armenia’s 1990 Declaration of Independence, which in turn references a 1989 resolution on the union of Armenia and Nagorny Karabakh. Azerbaijan says this constitutes a lurking territorial claim that needs to be removed.

"The constitution issue is surely fixable with some creative diplomacy—and also because Pashinyan himself wants a new constitution after the next parliamentary election, due in 2026. But Pashinyan has given away a lot, and his pockets are now almost empty. He wants to go into that election telling the public that he has secured a peace agreement—not, as his critics claim, merely capitulated to Azerbaijan. And the harder that Azerbaijan presses on this constitution issue, the harder it will be for Pashinyan to deliver," reads the article.