Opinion: Washington agreements leave security matters uncertain

By Vartan Oskanian, Armenia's former foreign minister

The Armenian politicians, experts, and pundits who welcome and support the signed and pre-signed deal of August 8 argue that, despite its shortcomings, the agreement offers Armenia a path out of isolation and closes once and for all the page of the conflict. Yet it is striking that all of them, without exception, rely on the safeguard clause of “despite shortcomings.” The truth is that the shortcomings of these documents are so numerous and so fundamental that they may outweigh all potential benefits for Armenia.

According to this optimistic reading, Armenia gains recognition of its current borders, assurances against the use of force, and economic advantages from new road and rail projects. Yet this interpretation leaves much to be desired. For all the promises of “hopeful progress,” the price and risks remain dangerously high. Four central concerns, often brushed aside, deserve emphasis.

First, no one who supports these agreements should forget that they come at the expense of the total loss of Nagorno-Karabakh. The treaty formalizes Azerbaijan’s military aggression and endorses the forced displacement of over 120,000 Armenians from their ancestral homeland. These documents would have had real value for the existence of Artsakh and Lachin, even under altered conditions of their political status, an opportunity that Pashinyan widely possessed during the first years of his rule. Under today’s circumstances, reading these documents and expressing satisfaction is, to put it mildly, very difficult.

Second, no matter how it is packaged, the so-called “connectivity” project grants Azerbaijan sovereign use of a corridor across Armenia’s most strategic region. Supporters insist the project respects Armenian sovereignty. In practice, however, Armenia is being compelled to cede control over transit to a state that has repeatedly threatened its existence. For Azerbaijan, this is not about mutual economic benefit but about fulfilling its long-standing demand for a corridor, something that undermines Armenia’s territorial integrity and security.

Third, the peace treaty itself offers no guarantee of Armenia’s sovereignty or territorial integrity. The text defers these issues to future border delimitation, which remains unsettled and vulnerable to Azerbaijani pressure. Baku has already shown that it interprets “peace” as conditional on ever-expanding concessions. Nothing in the Washington agreements prevents further demands on Armenia’s constitution, its borders, or its foreign policy.

Finally, much of the analysis surrounding the geopolitical implications of these agreements rests on shaky ground. Some argue that the arrangement will benefit all, Russia, Turkey, and Iran, while others insist it is designed to reduce Russian influence, curb Iran, or empower Turkey. The truth is that the South Caucasus, and the regions surrounding it, are in constant flux. No one can predict with certainty how regional dynamics will evolve, especially amid great-power rivalry. To claim that these agreements guarantee stability is to ignore history: the region has repeatedly shown how quickly supposed breakthroughs can unravel.

The August 8 agreements are less a foundation for peace than an affirmation of new realities, which unequivocally legitimize Armenian losses, leave security matters uncertain, and even deepen Armenia’s vulnerability. To applaud them without confronting these four realities is to mistake ceremony for substance.