AntiCor publishes extensive study on parliamentary elections

The entire process of the June 7 parliamentary elections in Armenia - the pre-election period, voting day, and post-election phase - was studied by AntiCor experts not only as an electoral process, but also as a combined field of public trust in the formation of state power, the use of administrative resources, political influence, and corruption risks.

The main conclusion of AntiCor’s expert observation is that electoral violations should not be viewed only in a technical or procedural sense. They are directly related to corruption, since the abuse of power, state resources, the law enforcement system, public servants, financial flows, or informational influence in the electoral process essentially creates an environment of political corruption. In this environment, the voter’s free will can be replaced by dependence, fear, coercion, administrative pressure, or material interest.

The CEC stated that there were no violations during the preparation and voting of the elections that could have affected the election results, but the applications submitted by opposition forces, the invalidated polling stations, the observation reports, and the post-election legal processes show that the issue of public trust remains unresolved.

1. Abuse of administrative resources

One of the most basic allegations made by opposition forces during the pre-election period was the use of administrative resources in favor of the ruling power. This is not just about the campaigning activity of state officials. A deeper problem is when the state system - community structures, schools, state institutions, public servants or structures affiliated with the government - are actually involved in the process of ensuring the electoral result of the ruling power.

From a corruption perspective, this means the privatization of a public resource for party purposes. The state, which should ensure equal competition, turns into a tool for the reproduction of power. In this case, elections lose their free and equal nature, and public office begins to serve not the public interest, but the party interest.

The initial assessment of international observers also noted the issue of an uneven campaign, pressure, and a tense political environment, although at the same time it was noted that voters were offered a real political choice.

2. The application of the law enforcement system in political competition

Among the opposition's allegations, the issue of criminal prosecutions and arrests occupies a special place. Arrests of opposition candidates and supporters were reported before the elections. Reuters wrote that six candidates from the "Strong Armenia" opposition force were arrested the day before the elections, and the opposition characterized these processes as politically motivated.

AntiCor believes that such involvement of the law enforcement system in the electoral process is one of the highest corruption risks. If criminal proceedings are based on real crimes, they should be investigated in a comprehensive, transparent and politically neutral manner. However, if the actions of the law enforcement system coincide with crucial stages of the electoral calendar and are directed primarily against active opposition circles, the public develops a well-founded suspicion of political control and restriction of electoral competition.

This risk is dangerous for two reasons. First, it can affect the organizational capabilities of opposition forces. Second, it can affect the psychological freedom of the voter, creating an atmosphere of fear. And a vote cast in conditions of fear is no longer a fully free expression of will.

3. Election bribery and the formation of material dependence

Any case of voter bribery or manipulation of voters with material gain is not only an electoral violation, but also classic political corruption. In this case, the vote becomes not an expression of civic will, but an object of commerce.

During the 2026 elections, numerous allegations of electoral bribery circulated in the public sphere. A number of cases of electoral bribery were revealed by anti-corruption bodies, and dozens of proceedings were initiated in February-June regarding electoral corruption.

For AntiCor, this direction is fundamental, because electoral bribery is not just an individual crime. It shows the deep connection between social vulnerability, political cynicism, and the failure of state control. When a voter can buy or sell their vote, it means that a crisis of trust has formed in the electoral system, and political forces speak to the public not with programs, but with the language of material dependence.

4. Unequal campaign conditions and hate speech

Among the problems recorded during the pre-election period was the hardening of political discourse, mutual accusations, elements of hate speech, and the inequality of the campaign field. Opposition forces claimed that the campaign was conducted under unequal conditions, and the ruling power had a state, media, and administrative advantage.

In terms of corruption, this applies not only to speech ethics, but also to the abuse of public information resources. When political rivals from positions of power are presented as enemies, threats, or criminal elements, this can replace argumentative competition with a politics of fear and labeling.

According to AntiCor, hate speech is an indirect form of electoral corruption, when an environment of psychological pressure is formed instead of the voter's conscious choice.

5. Voter identification and technical process issues

Voter identification is one of the most important aspects of the electoral process. According to opposition forces, there have been cases when voter data was entered not through fully automated verification, but through operator intervention. These allegations require a separate technical audit, as the matter may concern not a single precinct violation, but the reliability of the electoral system.

The corruption risk here is that technical opacity can become a tool to influence the election result. If the voter identification process is not fully controllable, verifiable, and subject to subsequent audit, the public cannot be sure that the number of voters and the circle of actual voters fully match.

Such risks are especially dangerous when the outcome of the elections is determined by small margins or when the invalidation of individual precincts could affect the possibility of a force entering parliament.

6. Risks surrounding military servicemen's voting

A particularly sensitive area is the voting of servicemen. Servicemen are in a relationship of service subordination, discipline, and command, which is why their free expression of will requires special guarantees.

Opposition circles have raised doubts about the organization and controllability of the military voting. According to AntiCor, the military voting should be viewed not as a routine administrative procedure, but as a high-risk electoral process. The state is obliged to ensure that the military does not feel any command, service, or psychological pressure.

If the voting of the army or the security system becomes a predictable or controllable source of votes for the government, then this is already a manifestation of political corruption: state subordination turns into a mechanism for managing the election results.

7. Election Day Violations

On Election Day, observation and news sources recorded a number of violations: violations of the secrecy of voting, cases of open voting, the presence of unauthorized persons, accumulations of people and vehicles in areas adjacent to polling stations, problems with voter assistance, and malfunctions of technical devices.

Each of these violations may seem technical or partial in isolation. However, their systematic combination indicates a risk of interference with the freedom of the voter. When the voter is not sure that his vote is secret, or when an atmosphere of control develops around the polling station, his expression of will can become unfree.

In terms of corruption, this means that an informal control system may operate on election day: precinct mediators, control groups, facilitators, or influential people “present.” This system can link voter bribery, administrative resources, and psychological pressure on the voter into a single chain.

8. Invalidation of polling station results

One of the most problematic issues in the post-election period was the invalidation of the results of several polling stations. The CEC invalidated the results of polling stations 10/51 and 35/65, recording the number of participants as 1,287 and 1,315, respectively, as a measure of inaccuracies, while the other results were nullified.

It was also later announced that the voting results in another precinct, 12/13, were invalidated due to the fact that ballot number 8 of the NDB was missing on voting day.

These circumstances have serious anti-corruption implications. If the result of a polling station is declared invalid, it should be clear why the violation occurred, who is responsible, and whether it was accidental negligence or the result of organized interference. Irresponsibility of the election administration is also a corruption risk, as it can render a voter’s vote null and void.

9. The issue of not scheduling a rerun

The Prosperous Armenia Party and other opposition groups have disputed the approach that results at polling stations can be declared invalid but not a rerun. According to publications, the CEC ultimately did not order a rerun in the three polling stations where the results were declared invalid.

The corruption significance of this issue is that a voter’s vote cannot simply be “vanished” as a result of an administrative decision. If the violation is so significant that the result of the entire precinct is nullified, then there must be a clear answer as to why voters are not given the opportunity to vote again. Otherwise, the issue of de facto cancellation of the right to vote arises.

Such decisions can have an impact not only on a given precinct, but also on the entire electoral picture, especially when it comes to the final outcome of the forces overcoming or not overcoming the threshold.

10. Impact of violations on the distribution of mandates

In the post-election phase, the question of whether the votes from the invalidated precincts affected the distribution of mandates became particularly important. The Central Electoral Commission confirmed the victory of the ruling force, and the distribution of mandates in the National Assembly was: 64 mandates for the CP, 29 for the "Strong Armenia" party, and 12 for the "Armenia" bloc.

However, for the opposition forces, the issue is not only the final arithmetic distribution of mandates. The problem is that if the cancellation of the results of individual precincts can deprive any force of the opportunity to enter parliament or change the ratio of political representation, then this process must be as open, justified, and legally invulnerable as possible.

According to AntiCor, any inaccuracy affecting the distribution of mandates should be considered a high corruption risk, as it may change not only the arithmetic result, but also the political representation of the public will.

11. The relationship between external influence and the internal corruption environment

International observers also documented external pressures and attempts at influence, including attempts to influence voters through trade restrictions and security threats.

Although external influence may at first glance be viewed as a security or geopolitical issue, it also has anti-corruption implications. External influence becomes effective in countries with weak domestic institutions, political dependencies, opaque financing, and vulnerable electoral systems.

In other words, external interference and internal corruption often feed each other. If the political arena is financially opaque, if parties depend on non-public sources, if the media operates on political orders, then it becomes easier for external forces to influence the electoral process.

12. The issue of transparency in electoral administration

The decisions of the CEC and election commissions must not only be legally correct, but also understandable and trustworthy to the public. Trust in elections is not built by publishing the final protocol alone. It is built when every complaint, every contested precinct, every technical inaccuracy, and every invalidated result receives a clear, reasoned, and public explanation.

AntiCor believes that the lack of transparency in electoral administration is itself a corruption risk. It creates the impression that decisions may be made based on calculating political consequences rather than protecting voter rights.

Conclusion

AntiCor's expert study on the 2026 RA NA elections shows that the violations recorded and presented by the opposition should be viewed not as isolated episodes, but in the context of systemic risks.

The main areas of violations are: abuse of administrative resources, possible political use of the law enforcement system, risks of electoral bribery, campaign inequality, voter identification issues, vulnerability of military personnel to vote, procedural violations on election day, invalidation of precinct results, controversial decisions not to schedule a rerun, and their possible impact on the distribution of mandates.

According to AntiCor, all of this forms a broad field of political corruption, where the process of forming public authority may be subject not to free competition, but to the combined influence of administrative, law enforcement, financial, informational, and psychological influences.

Electoral corruption is dangerous because it is not limited to election day. It later turns into corrupt governance, because a government that was formed under dubious or unequal conditions is naturally less accountable to the public and more inclined to maintain the same mechanisms through which it was reproduced.

AntiCor notes that an independent, comprehensive and public electoral audit is required after the 2026 parliamentary elections, including the voter identification system, invalidated polling stations, military voting, bribery proceedings, cases of administrative recourse, and the justifications for CEC decisions. Without such an audit, the legal conclusion of the elections cannot be considered a restoration of public trust.